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We analyze an economy with banks and markets and uncover impli-
cations of the presence of asset markets for the run-prone banking sector.
Consumers can split their endowment between a market investment and
a deposit contract which admits bank runs. Banks specialize in provid-
ing ex ante liquidity insurance. Market investment acts as insurance if
there is a run. Banks provide a higher degree of the liquidity insurance
while facing a lower probability of a run when compared to the banks-only
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11 Introduction
The banking system is often viewed as the base of a ￿nancial system. It is on
this base that ￿nancial markets are built. It is not surprising then that emerging
economies, where ￿nancial markets are underdeveloped, tend to rely heavily on
the banking system as a means of transforming savings into investment. Em-
pirically, a close relationship between the level of the stock market and banking
sector development has been documented. At the same time, banks￿problems
are more recurrent and insolvency is more costly in the developing world1.
One might wonder whether the nonexistence of alternative channels to allo-
cate funds can contribute to the instability of the banking sector. In this paper
we ask how ￿nancial deepening in￿ uences the banking sector. We use the term
"￿nancial deepening" broadly to denote the development of ￿nancial markets.
We model this development by introducing a possibility for economic agents to
invest and trade assets in an asset market. We derive the implications of the
existence of an asset market for the banks￿role in liquidity provision and for
the probability of a run banks face.
We develop a simple three-period equilibrium model that includes economy-
wide aggregate shocks (a⁄ecting asset returns and cross-sectional distribution of
preferences) and idiosyncratic preference shocks (as in Diamond and Dybvig[15]).
Consumers deposit their endowments with ￿nancial intermediaries in exchange
for a complex banking-￿nancial contract. The contract speci￿es what part of
the endowment is invested in a private market portfolio. Private portfolio can
be readjusted by trading in the asset market in the interim period. Prices of
assets in the market depend on the amount of liquidity in the market and thus
on the aggregate state of the world. The rest of the endowment is exchanged
for a demand deposit contract which promises a ￿xed payment independent of
1See Caprio and Klingebiel [8].
2the aggregate state of the world in the interim period. The reason we focus
on this type of contracts is that more sophisticated contracts are not observed
in practice, especially in developing countries. We refer to the demand deposit
part of the banking-￿nancial contract as a "bank".
Risk-averse consumers are ex ante identical. After idiosyncratic preference
shocks are realized, individuals become either early consumers (who value only
immediate consumption), or late consumers (who value future consumption).
So there are two ex post types. A consumer￿ s realized type is assumed to be
private information and thus it is not possible to write type-contingent insurance
contracts. Then, in a competitive market equilibrium, idiosyncratic risk is non-
diversi￿able. By contrast, banks can provide insurance against unobservable
preference shocks by pooling depositors￿resources and creating an ex ante cross-
subsidy between ex post types (liquidity insurance). However, banks are subject
to a run. This makes demand deposits a risky investment.
An important part of the banking-￿nancial contract is a trading restriction.
Consumers are only allowed to retrade their original portfolio holdings. This
assumption allows banks to provide the ex ante cross-subsidy in the optimum2.
It enables us to uncover the e⁄ects market investment has on the properties of
demand deposit contracts, the probability of a run banks face, and consumers￿
welfare.
To evaluate the e⁄ects of the presence of the asset market on the stability of
banks, we need a device that ties together changes in the deposit contract in the
economy with markets and the probability of a run. For this purpose, we use
the concept of a risk-factor of the run equilibrium, originally proposed by Ennis
and Keister [16]. The risk-factor makes it possible to compute the probability of
a run banks face in the banks-only economy and compare it to the probability
of a run in the economy with banks and markets.
2We discuss this assumption further in subsection 3.3.
3A late consumer has to decide in the interim period whether or not to run
on the bank. Running is only optimal if other late consumers run, too. This
is the essence of panic-driven runs. The argument we develop here is that a
late type￿ s "incentive to run" is in￿ uenced by the possibility for consumers to
invest and trade in the asset market. This is because market investment acts as
insurance for consumers who deposit part of their endowment in the run-prone
banking sector. In case of a run, both types of consumers are guaranteed that
their wealth will be positive.
Our results can be summarized as follows. A standard ￿nding in the bank
runs literature (for banks-only economies) is that banks face a trade-o⁄between
liquidity provision and stability: The higher the cross-subsidy they create, the
higher the probability of a bank run. We show by examples that the presence
of the asset market reduces probability of a run on the banking sector thus
making it more stable. At the same time, banks provide more liquidity when
compared to the economy with banks only. With markets weakening the trade-
o⁄ between the liquidity provision and the probability of a run, the banking
sector "specializes" in creating the ex ante cross-subsidy between early and late
types. In essence, banks reward risk-averse consumers for getting insurance
against bank runs by investing in the market.
There is always a possibility to o⁄er a deposit contract that is immune to
runs, a so-called run proof contract. The cost of o⁄ering such a contract ex ante
is that it provides no liquidity insurance. In banks-only economies, the run proof
contract is o⁄ered once the probability of a run exceeds a certain threshold value.
Below this value, the bene￿t of run admitting contracts (liquidity provision)
outweighs the cost (possibility of a run) and runs are tolerated in equilibrium.
We ￿nd in our examples that in the economy with banks and markets run
proof contracts are not o⁄ered. Once the probability of a run exceeds a certain
4threshold level, consumers choose to invest in the market portfolio only. A
related ￿nding is that runs are tolerated for higher values of the probability of
a run in the economy with banks and markets than in the banks-only economy.
This is possible due to the existence of the insurance against bank runs provided
by markets.
The ex ante welfare in the banking-￿nancial economy is higher as compared
to the economy with banks, or markets, alone. This result arises despite the fact
that adding an additional asset (the demand deposit contract) to the incomplete
asset structure does not complete markets in this economy. The driving force
behind this ￿nding is the di⁄erent nature of services provided by banks and
markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
discuss the related literature. In section 3, we describe the model. Subsequently,
we analyze functioning of the asset market: optimal portfolio choice and deter-
mination of asset prices. In section 5, we examine banks￿behavior (assuming the
asset market is non-existent), namely properties of the deposit contract o⁄ered
and when it is optimal for banks to o⁄er a run proof contract. We introduce
the concept of the risk-factor of the run equilibrium. In section 6, we analyze
the economy with both banks and markets and describe the banking-￿nancial
contract. Section 7 contains some numerical examples and discussion of our
main results. We conclude in section 8. For ease of exposition, all proofs are in
the appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper builds on three broad strands of literature. First strand concerns
liquidity-based asset pricing. Our second building block is bank runs literature.
Finally, our analysis is related to a series of papers dealing with coexistence and
5interaction between banks and markets.
In modeling the asset market we follow Allen and Gale [1]3. We introduce
aggregate uncertainty. In equilibrium, price of an asset depends on the amount
of liquidity in the market.
The role of banks we focus on is provision of liquidity and maturity transfor-
mation. First to address the implications of the maturity mismatch in bank￿ s
balance sheet for its stability were Diamond and Dybvig [15]4. They showed
that the simple demand deposit contract can implement the ￿rst-best (full infor-
mation) allocation but it also admits a bank run equilibrium in the post-deposit
game. The issue not tackled in their paper is whether consumers would be
willing to deposit in the bank ex ante, knowing that there exists a bank run
equilibrium. This problem requires solving a full pre-deposit game and intro-
ducing an equilibrium selection rule.
Peck and Shell [24] consider a broad set of possible deposit contracts and
show that depositors can prefer a contract that admits sunspot-triggered bank
runs in equilibrium provided that the probability of a bank run is su¢ ciently
small. The bank can always choose a run proof contract, i.e. the contract
that induces a unique no run equilibrium in the post-deposit game. Cost of
choosing such a contract ex ante is that it provides no liquidity insurance. Ennis
and Keister [16] study the e⁄ect of the possibility of a bank run on capital
formation and economic growth. We adopt the concept of the risk-factor of the
run equilibrium they introduced to model the strength of individuals￿incentives
to run. This is an important ingredient of our analysis that unveils the e⁄ect
market investment has on the probability of a run. In all models above, banks
face a trade-o⁄between liquidity provision and possibility of a run5. By contrast,
3In the paper, they examine volatility of asset prices in ￿nancial markets.
4See also Bryant [6].
5Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) reach the same conclusion in Morris and Shin￿ s [23] frame-
work.
6presence of the asset market in our setup makes this link considerably weaker.
The strand of the literature focusing on the interaction between markets and
banks and its impact on liquidity provision starts with Jacklin [21]. He allows
agents in the Diamond-Dybvig model to trade bank assets at an exogenously
￿xed price in a competitive market. Jacklin points out that introduction of
the market eliminates the ability of banks to provide liquidity by creating an ex
ante cross-subsidy. This is due to the fact that if the banking contract continued
providing liquidity insurance, a late consumer would have an incentive to make
his withdrawal in period 1 and trade period-one consumption in the asset market
for claims on period-two consumption. Moreover, individuals are able to achieve
the only feasible, incentive compatible consumption allocation in the economy
by holding assets directly and subsequently trading in the market.
Diamond [14] shows that under the assumption of the limited market partic-
ipation, banks and markets can coexist. Banks￿ability to create a cross-subsidy
between early and late types is reduced but not eliminated (unlike in Jacklin
[21]). He analyzes e⁄ects of ￿nancial development on the structure and market
share of banks. Banking sector in his model is not prone to bank runs. Limited
market participation leads to the illiquidity problem in the market (lower price
of the asset than the one that would arise if participation was full). In this
environment, existence of the banking sector can divert some liquidity demand
away from the asset market and thus help improve the illiquidity problem. Our
paper is looking at the interaction between banks and markets from the oppo-
site angle. It is in the banking sector where problems can arise (bank runs).
Here, the reason for consumers to invest in both banks and (indirectly) markets
is acquiring liquidity insurance on one hand and buying insurance against bank
runs on the other.
A recent paper by Allen and Gale [3] constructs a model of a complex ￿nan-
7cial system and uses it for evaluating government intervention and regulation
of liquidity provision. Consumers give their endowments to banks and do not
directly participate in the ￿nancial market. Banks have full access to a set of
Arrow securities markets in period 0 and a spot market in period 1. Panic-based
bank runs are ruled out by assumption. As long as markets are complete, there
is no scope for welfare-improving government intervention to prevent ￿nancial
crises. With incomplete markets, the outcome is "ine¢ cient". In our model,
markets are incomplete and banks are o⁄ering contracts which admit bank runs.
We are able to make predictions about the probability of a run on the bank-
ing sector and show by examples that the asset market brings about a welfare
improvement in the incomplete markets/incomplete contracts setup.
3 The Model
There are three periods, t = 0;1; and 2 and a single homogeneous good. Con-
sumption and asset returns are measured in terms of the good.
The economy is subject to aggregate shocks that a⁄ect return on a long-
term asset, R, and aggregate demand for liquidity, ￿. Let R and ￿ be two
random variables de￿ned on a discrete probability space. Let ￿ denote the
corresponding two-dimensional space of R and ￿. Let g (R) and f (￿) be the
marginal probability mass functions of R and ￿, respectively. We assume that
these two random variables are independent. E⁄ectively, there is a ￿nite number
of aggregate states of the world, denoted by ￿ 2 ￿, each of which is characterized
by particular realizations of the aggregate demand for liquidity and the return
on the long-term asset. Values of the long-term asset return R and aggregate
demand for liquidity ￿ are realized (but not publicly revealed) at the beginning
of period 16.
6We use R and ￿ to denote both the random variables themselves and their realized values.
8In addition to aggregate shocks, each individual is subject to idiosyncratic
preference shocks, which determine his demand for liquidity (more details shortly).
3.1 Consumers
There is a [0;1] continuum of consumers, each lives for three periods. Every
consumer has an endowment ! equal to 1 unit of the good in period 0.
Ex ante (as of period 0), individuals are identical. In period 1 individuals
receive an idiosyncratic preference shock which will cause some of them to be-
come "early" consumers (they only value period-one consumption, u = u(c1))
and some "late" consumers (who only value period-two consumption; if they
receive good early they can store it, u = u(c1 + c2)). Probability of being an
early type is ￿ (thus, probability of being a late type is (1 ￿ ￿)). We assume
￿ > 0 for all realizations of ￿. As is standard in the literature, we invoke "law of
large numbers" convention and assume that the cross-sectional distribution of
types is the same as the probability distribution ￿. Hence, ￿ is also the fraction
of consumers in population who face an urgent liquidity need in period 1. Fol-
lowing Peck and Shell [24], we denote the probability that the fraction of early
consumers is ￿ conditional on a consumer￿ s being late by fp (￿). Using Bayes￿
rule, we have that
fp (￿) =
(1 ￿ ￿)f (￿)
P
￿
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ )f (￿ ￿ )
:
Individuals maximize expected utility of consumption. Let u(ct) denote
utility of a consumer in period t. The function u(c) is twice continuously di⁄er-
entiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. Moreover, u(0) = 0 and the
coe¢ cient of the relative risk aversion is greater than 1 for c 2 [1;R] 7.
It will be clear from the context what we have in mind.
7An example of the utility function satisfying these properties is u(c) =
￿1c
1+￿2c; ￿1 > 0;
￿2 > 1. We will use this functional form when computing numerical examples in Sections 5 and
6. Note that we cannot use the constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function u(c) = c1￿￿
1￿￿ ,
93.2 Asset Structure
There are two real assets in the economy: a short-term (liquid) asset and a long-
term (illiquid) asset. A short-term asset is represented by the costless storage
technology: it o⁄ers a return equal to 1 after one period8. A long-term asset
yields a random return R after two periods. We assume that R > 1 always
holds to re￿ ect that the long-term asset is more productive than the short-term
asset over the long-run. Furthermore, we assume an existence of the liquidation
technology which allows to liquidate the long-term asset early, in period 1. This
yields a ￿xed liquidation return L. We assume L 2 (0;1) to re￿ ect that early
liquidation is costly. Whenever the asset market is present in the economy, the
long-term asset can be sold at the market price P1 instead of being privately
liquidated.
Constant returns to scale technology allows consumers/banks to transform
one unit of the good into one unit of the short-term or long-term asset in period
0. Short sales are not allowed. Asset payo⁄s are summarized below:
Date t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Short asset 1 ! 1 ! 1
Long asset 1 ! L or P1 ! R > 1
3.3 Banks and Markets
Consumers always have an option to costlessly store their endowment (autarky)
and thus achieve utility equal to u(1). We let u denote this autarky level of
utility.
Banks o⁄er a complex banking-￿nancial contracts in period 0. The contract
where ￿ > 1 is the coe¢ cient of the relative risk aversion. This function does not satisfy
u(0) = 0.
8We use the storage technology only for technical simplicity. Nothing substantial would
change if the short term asset was represented by an interest-bearing, perfectly liquid security.
10allows consumer to invest (part of) his endowment in a portfolio of assets,
with an option to re-balance this portfolio in period 1, once the private shock
is realized. Moreover, consumer chooses how much to invest in the demand
deposit contract, which o⁄ers a ￿xed period-one return.
We assume that consumers are only allowed to retrade their original portfolio
holdings. This is an important assumption. We know that in a partial equilib-
rium framework [21], or in a general equilibrium setup with complete markets
[3], the banking allocation is weakly dominated by the market allocation when
consumers participate in markets directly. This is because as long as the deposit
contract provides an ex ante cross-subsidy, a late consumer has an incentive to
withdraw from the bank in period 1 and sell his period-one consumption in the
market in exchange for the period-two consumption (we call this phenomenon
"cash-out"). By doing so he is able to achieve a higher return than the return
he would get from the bank if he waited until period 2 to withdraw. Banks
providing the liquidity insurance and markets cannot coexist. We ￿nd that the
problem of the cash-out extends to our incomplete markets setting if we allow
consumers to directly participate in the asset market.
There are several ways how to change the model to allow for an equilibrium
coexistence between banks and markets. A notable example is an extension
along the lines of Diamond [14]9. However, possible changes introduce new
mechanisms in the standard Diamond and Dybvig framework and make it harder
to disentangle what role the possibility to invest in the asset market plays in
stabilizing the banking sector. Instead, we choose to impose a trading rule as a
part of the banking-￿nancial contract to stay close to the traditional bank runs
model.
In summary, the timing of events is as follows. In period 0, a consumer
receives an endowment of 1 which he can deposit in the bank in exchange for the
9See previous section for the discussion of this paper.
11banking-￿nancial contract. At the beginning of period 1, a consumer privately
observes his type. Early consumers withdraw from the bank. Late consumers
decide whether to withdraw in period 1 or 2. Banks pay out a promised period-
one return on withdrawals. Then, there is a centralized trading in the asset
market. Both early and late types adjust their market portfolio holdings. Banks
trade in the market if they ￿nd it optimal to do so. Early types consume
their wealth, consisting of a return on the market investment and the bank
withdrawal. At the beginning of time 2, the realized return on the long-term
asset R is revealed. Late types consume their wealth, consisting of a return on
the market investment and the bank withdrawal.
4 Asset Market10
We now look at the economy with an asset market only (banks are absent). In
period 0, a consumer decides how much to invest in the short-term asset and
how much to invest in the long-term asset. Let ￿ denote the fraction of his
endowment invested in the short-term asset. Then, (1 ￿ ￿) fraction is invested
in the long-term asset.
At the beginning of period 1, the period-two return on the long-term asset R,
the aggregate liquidity demand (fraction of early consumers in the population)
￿, and consumers￿idiosyncratic preference shocks are realized. Individuals pri-
vately observe the realization of the preference shock. They do not observe the
realizations of R and ￿. Then, assets are traded in the market. We normalize
the price of period-one consumption to 1. It is easy to show that the price of
the short-term asset coincides with the price of period-one consumption and is
10In what follows we build on Allen and Gale [1]. The main di⁄erence between their
approach and ours is that in their model, all uncertainty is resolved in the beginning of period
1. Here, the realization of the two random variables, ￿ and R, is not revealed to market
participants in period 1. Thus, agents make inferences from the market price.
12equal to 111. Let P1 (￿) 12 denote the price of one unit of the long-term asset in
terms of period-one consumption in state ￿. We assume that individuals know
and take as given price function P1. They submit optimal amounts of the short-
and long-term assets to sell (given their expectations about the price) and price
P1 (￿) clears the market. At date 0, given the expected utility consumers can
achieve in period 1, they choose ￿ optimally.
De￿nition 1 (Equilibrium) Equilibrium is characterized by a price P1 (￿)
that clears the asset market in state ￿ and period 1; optimal ￿nal consumption
allocations for early and late types, respectively; and a portfolio choice (￿;1 ￿ ￿)
that maximizes expected utility given P1 in period 0.
We ￿rst analyze asset market equilibrium in period 1. We then look at the
optimal portfolio choice in period 0.
At the beginning of period 1, each individual holds a portfolio (￿;1 ￿ ￿). For
now, we assume 0 < ￿ < 113. Fraction ￿ > 0 of consumers becomes early and
fraction (1 ￿ ￿) becomes late. It is straightforward to show that in equilibrium,
early consumers keep their initial short-term asset holdings and may choose to
acquire more short-term asset using their long-term asset holdings. An early
consumer prefers to sell some or all of his long-term asset holdings in the market
in exchange for the short-term asset as long as P1 (￿) ￿ L (since he can privately
liquidate the long-term asset and gather return L per unit). Let 0 ￿ b(P1) ￿ 1
denote the optimal fraction of the long-term asset holdings to be sold. Then,
11We will thus talk about the short-term asset and period-one consumption interchangeably.
12We use (￿) to denote dependence of the variable on the outcome for both R and ￿.
Henceforth, we will use (￿) to denote dependence on the outcome for ￿ and analogously for
R.
13We prove this is indeed the case in Proposition 6.
13an early consumer￿ s supply is as follows
b =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1 if P1 > L
[0;1] if P1 = L
0 if P1 < L
:
Let S be the total amount of the long-term asset early consumers supply to the
market in period 1. We have
S ￿ ￿b(P1)(1 ￿ ￿)! ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)!:
It is easy to show that in equilibrium, late consumers keep their initial long-
term asset holdings until period 2 and may choose to acquire more long-term as-
set using their short-term asset holdings. Each late consumer holds the amount
equal to ￿! of the short-term asset. Let us denote the optimal fraction of the
short-term asset holdings to be sold by a(P1), 0 ￿ a(P1) ￿ 1. The remain-
ing part of the short-term asset holdings, (1 ￿ a(P1))￿! ￿ 0 is reinvested for
one more period. Whenever a(P1) < 1 we say that a late consumer prefers to
diversify, i.e. his portfolio in period 2 consists of both the short-term and the
long-term asset. Let D denote the total amount of the short-term asset supplied
by the late types to the asset market. We have
D ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a(P1)￿! ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿!:
The price that clears the market is given by
P1 (￿)S = D;
i.e. the value of period 2 claims in period 1 (supplied by the early consumers)
14has to equal to the value of period 1 claims in period 1 (supplied by the late
consumers). Holding the long-term asset is risky due to the rate-of-return risk
(realization of R is unknown until period 2) and the market risk (P1 is uncer-
tain).
We now characterize the equilibrium price function. First, note that price
P1 (￿) cannot contain any information about the return on the long-term asset,
R, since it is unknown to all market participants. Then, there are two possibil-
ities: either price reveals some information about ￿, or price is non-revealing.
We can prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Price P1 fully reveals ￿ in period 1.
Since price P1 fully reveals ￿, we write P1 (￿) and we have
P1 (￿)￿b(P1)(1 ￿ ￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)a(P1)￿
and a(P1), b(P1), and P1 are the same for the states with the same ￿. Then,








+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿






0 ￿ a(P1) ￿ 1:
We now state and prove (in the appendix) the following useful Lemma.
Lemma 3 There exists a strictly positive price, which we denote by P1, such
that for all P1 ￿ P1, late types prefer to completely diversify their portfolios, i.e.
their demand for the long-term asset for a given ￿ is zero. Similarly, there exists
a strictly positive price, which we denote by P1, such that for all P1 ￿ P1, late
15consumers want to hold long-term asset only and thus sell their entire holdings
of the short-term asset in period 1.
Also, we show that P1 ￿ L always holds.
Lemma 4 Price P1 is always greater or equal to the liquidation return L and
early consumers supply a strictly positive amount of the long-term asset to the
market.
If in an equilibrium price P1 (￿) is equal to the liquidation return L, then
we know from lemma 3 that late consumers prefer to hold the long-term asset
only. This is because L < P1 and the long-term asset o⁄ers a strictly higher net
return that the short-term asset. Thus,
D = (1 ￿ ￿)￿!
in this case. Early consumers are indi⁄erent between private liquidation of the





If in an equilibrium price P1 (￿) > L, then early consumers prefer to sell
their entire long-term asset holdings in the market, i.e. b(P1) = 1. Thus, the
supply of the long-term asset is given by ￿(1 ￿ ￿)! and is ￿xed for a given ￿.
This implies that the price in the market cannot exceed
(1￿￿)￿
￿(1￿￿) since (1 ￿ ￿)￿!
is the maximum possible level of the demand for the long-term asset, D. If for




then late types always want to hold the long-term asset only and thus sell their
entire short-term asset holdings, a = 1. The equilibrium price is equal to
(1￿￿)￿
￿(1￿￿).




holds, then late consumers prefer to diversify their portfolio and hold both the
short-term and the long-term asset. They choose an optimal amount of the
short-term asset to sell, 0 < a ￿ 1, with the resulting equilibrium price being
P1 2 [P1;P1). We summarize our ￿ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For a given ￿, there are three possible cases. 1) The equilibrium
price is equal to L. Late consumers prefer to hold the long-term asset only and
early consumers sell the fraction
￿(1￿￿)
L￿(1￿￿) of their long-term asset holdings. 2)
The price in the market that would arise if late consumers sold their entire short-
term asset holdings,
(1￿￿)￿
￿(1￿￿), is smaller than P1. Then, late consumers prefer
to hold the long-term asset only and the resulting equilibrium price is equal to
(1￿￿)￿
￿(1￿￿). 3) The price
(1￿￿)￿
￿(1￿￿) is greater or equal to P1. Then, late consumers
prefer to diversify their portfolio holdings. They choose 0 < a ￿ 1 optimally and
the resulting equilibrium price is given by P1 =
(1￿￿)a￿
￿(1￿￿) with P1 2 [P1;P1).
Let us look at the decisions made in period 0. Consider a consumer who
chooses portfolio (￿;1 ￿ ￿). At date 1, if a consumer turns out to be an early
type, he either sells all of his long-term asset holdings at price P1 (￿) > L, or
sells a fraction b(P1) at price P1 = L and liquidates the remaining part of the
long-term holdings privately. His period-one wealth, which we denote by c1, can
be written as
c1 (￿) = [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)P1 (￿)]!:
If a consumer turns out to be a late type, he adjusts his portfolio holdings
in period 1, gathers realized return on the long-term asset in period 2, and





+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
R + (1 ￿ a(P1))￿
￿
!:
A consumer chooses ￿ to maximize the expected utility that can be achieved





[￿u(c1 (￿)) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(c2 (￿))]f (￿)g (R) (MP)
subject to
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1:
Let ￿2 denote the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint ￿ ￿ 0. Let ￿3 denote
the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0. Then, optimal ￿ must













R + 1 ￿ a(P1))]!f (￿)g (R) + ￿2 ￿ ￿3 = 0:
We can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6 In equilibrium, consumers prefer to diversify their period-zero
portfolios by investing a strictly positive fraction of the endowment in the long-
term asset and thus a positive fraction of the endowment in the short-term asset.
Using the standard ￿xed-point argument we can show that there exists an
asset market equilibrium for all parameter values.
Proposition 7 There exists an asset market equilibrium for all parameter val-
ues.
18We now turn our attention to analyzing the behavior of banks in the econ-
omy, in which banks are the only alternative to the autarky (asset market is
non-existent).
5 Banking Sector
Banks operate in a perfectly competitive environment and thus their objective
is to maximize the expected utility of depositors.
To retain tractability, we restrict banks to o⁄er demand deposit contracts,
i.e. contracts of the form (c1;c2 (￿)). A return c1 is ￿xed and is promised to a
depositor withdrawing in period 114. A bank stands up to this obligation unless
it has run out of funds. In period 2, whatever is left in the bank is divided equally
among the remaining depositors. Due to the variation in the aggregate demand
for liquidity and the return on the long-term asset, this amount, c2 (￿), varies
across states. In period 0, banks decide how much to invest in the short-term
asset. Let ￿ denote the fraction of bank￿ s resources put into the short-term asset.
This variable is also speci￿ed in the banking contract. The remaining resources
are invested in the long-term asset. If the banks need to liquidate some or all of
their long-term asset holdings in period 1, they use the liquidation technology
and gather return equal to L per unit of the long-term asset held.
In period 0, an individual decides whether or not to join a bank. If he
does not deposit his endowment in the bank, he can store it and consume later
(in period 1 if early and in period 2 if late). This would yield utility level u.
Banks can always provide this same utility level by investing all resources in the
short-term asset and o⁄ering the contract (c1 = 1;c2 = 1). Given that banks
can provide a better consumption pro￿le, all consumers choose to participate in
14Wallace [27] argues that in the economy with aggregate uncertainty about ￿, the best
feasible contract will in general have c1 depend on the order in which consumers arrive to
the bank. Incorporating this feature into our analysis would not, qualitatively, change our
conclusions and would make the analysis harder.
19the banking sector.
After banks have set the banking contract and consumers have made their
deposits, the so-called "post-deposit game" begins. Each individual learns his
type at the beginning of period 1 and decides whether to withdraw from the
bank in period 1 or in period 2. We assume that banks serve their customers
sequentially and continue paying o⁄ c1 until they runs out of funds. There is
no suspension of convertibility. Early types always withdraw in period 1. Late
consumers have a choice to withdraw in period 1 or in period 2.
The bank always o⁄ers a contract which is incentive-compatible, i.e. a late
consumer￿ s expected payo⁄from withdrawing in period 2 is higher than his pay-
o⁄ from withdrawing early given that all other late consumers wait until period
2 to withdraw. Following the literature, we look at symmetric, pure-strategy
equilibria to the game played by late consumers. Two types of equilibria are
possible. In the "no run" Nash equilibrium, early consumers withdraw in period
1 and late consumers wait until period 2 to make their withdrawals. However,
whenever the bank chooses an incentive-compatible contract such that if all de-
positors showed up at the bank in period 1, it would not have enough resources
to pay o⁄ c1 to everyone, there exists another, bank run, Nash equilibrium to
the game. The reason is that if a late consumer believes that all other late con-
sumers will try to withdraw in period 1, it is in his best interest to withdraw,
too (and store the good to consume it in period 2). If he waited until period 2,
his return on the bank withdrawal would be zero (the bank runs out of funds by
the end of period 1). When a late consumer chooses to withdraw from the bank
in period 1, we say that he "runs". We de￿ne a bank run equilibrium below.
De￿nition 8 (Bank Run) Panic-based bank run equilibrium is a Nash equi-
librium to the post-deposit game such that each late consumer ￿nds it optimal
to withdraw in period 1 because he believes that all other late consumers will
20withdraw in period 1 and hence the bank will run out of funds before the end of
period 1. Thus, both early and late consumers withdraw from the bank at t = 1.
On the other hand, if a bank has enough resources to pay o⁄ c1 to everyone
in period 1, it is a dominant strategy for late consumers to withdraw in period
2 and there is only one (no run) equilibrium to the post-deposit game. The
contract satisfying this property is said to be run proof. A bank is always able
to o⁄er a run proof contract. This also implies that for every banking contract,
at least one symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium exists: the no-run outcome is
an equilibrium if the banking contract is run-proof.
If the aggregate demand for liquidity in some state of the world turns out
be unexpectedly high, the bank can "run-out" of funds. We de￿ne the concept
below.
De￿nition 9 (Running-out) Running-out occurs when a bank does not have
enough resources to pay o⁄ c1 to all early consumers even after liquidating its
long-term asset holdings. Only a proportion of the early consumers is served by
the bank (those ￿rst in line).
It is important to note that in the case of running-out only early consumers
withdraw from the bank in period 1. Late types wait until period 2 to withdraw
(they don￿ t observe the realization of the aggregate liquidity shock and thus
don￿ t know that the bank will run out of funds in period 1). Thus, the payo⁄
of all late consumers and the proportion of the early consumers that was not
served by the bank in period 1 is equal to zero.
To analyze a bank￿ s problem, we specify some useful notation15. Let ￿
denote the fraction of consumers withdrawing in period 1 such that this level of
withdrawals just exhausts bank￿ s investment in the short-term asset, ￿. (A bank
15Bank￿ s optimization problem in this section is similar to the bank￿ s problem in Ennis and
Keister [16].
21will ￿rst use the short-term asset to pay o⁄ ￿rst-period withdrawals; only after
this source is depleted, it will start liquidating its long-term investment.) If the
realization of ￿ is such that ￿ < ￿, a part of the investment in the short-term
asset will not be used to pay o⁄consumers in period 1 and will be reinvested for
one more period. Another variable of interest is ￿, which denotes a proportion of
consumers who get c1 before the bank completely runs out of funds. For ￿ such
that ￿ < ￿ < ￿, the bank needs to liquidate a part of its long-term investment
to satisfy liquidity demand in period 1. We let ￿￿ be the subset of the set of
possible values of ￿ such that for all ￿ 2 ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ holds. Similarly, let ￿￿ be
the subset of the set of possible values of ￿ such that for all ￿ 2 ￿￿, ￿ < ￿ < ￿
holds. Finally, let ￿￿ be a shortcut notation for ￿￿ [ ￿￿.
We ￿rst brie￿ y discuss a bank￿ s problem and properties of the optimal con-
tract when the ex post types (early/late) are observable. Then, we analyze the
main case of our interest: the case when individual types are unobservable to
the bank.
5.1 First Best Contract





































1￿￿ if ￿ 2 ￿￿
:
Banks serve early consumers sequentially and continue paying o⁄ c1 in period 1
until they run out of funds. All late consumers arrive to the bank in period 2. If
the liquidity demand in some state of the world turns out to be high, i.e. ￿ ￿ ￿,
banks serve ￿rst ￿ early consumers and the return on the bank withdrawal for
all the remaining consumers, namely (￿￿￿) early types and (1 ￿ ￿) late types,
is equal to zero.
In the next Lemma, we state a result that is well-known in the bank runs
literature.
Lemma 10 Suppose ￿ is non-stochastic. Then, the ￿rst best contract satis￿es
c￿
1 > 1 and c￿
2 (￿) < R. This implies the preference for liquidity (and cross-
subsidy) between early and late consumers.
Risk-averse consumers want ex ante insurance against the "bad luck" of
becoming early consumers in period 1. They prefer a higher period-one con-
sumption at the expense of a somewhat lower period-two consumption.
5.2 Asymmetric Information in period 1
We now analyze the case when ex post types are unobservable to the bank. At
the beginning of period 1, a consumer learns his type and it is private informa-
tion. How does this change the optimization problem banks face?
We know that a bank always o⁄ers an incentive-compatible contract (a con-
tract that admits a no run equilibrium to the post-deposit game). Within the
class of incentive compatible contracts we can distinguish two types of contracts:
1) run proof contracts and 2) run admitting contracts.
Run proof contracts are contracts such that it is a dominant strategy for a
23late consumer to wait until period 2 to withdraw. Run proof contracts must
satisfy the following condition
c1 ￿ ￿ + L(1 ￿ ￿):
The condition states that the bank has always enough resources to pay o⁄ c1
to everyone in period 1. This eliminates panic-based bank runs since a late
consumer￿ s payo⁄ from withdrawing in period 2 is at least as high as his payo⁄
from withdrawing in period 1 regardless of when other late consumers make their
withdrawals. Thus, there is only one, no run, equilibrium to the post-deposit
game.
If the bank ￿nds it optimal to o⁄er a run proof contract, it will choose

























1￿￿ if ￿ < ￿ < 1
:
The run-proof condition implies that ￿ = 1.







and the corresponding maximized level of utility by EURP. Banks are always
able to o⁄er a run proof contract. However, there is a cost to making the
contract run proof. A run proof contract cannot provide liquidity insurance
since c1 ￿ ￿ + L(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1 for all 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. This lowers the welfare of
24risk-averse consumers.
A run admitting contract admits two equilibria to the post-deposit game, a
no run equilibrium and a run equilibrium. It satis￿es the following condition
c1 > ￿ + L(1 ￿ ￿):
The condition states that the bank would for sure run out of funds in period 1 if
all depositors arrived to the bank in period 1. Hence, if a late consumer believes
that all other late consumers will run in period 1, it is in his best interest to
run, too since waiting until period 2 would yield zero payo⁄.
When there are two equilibria to the post-deposit game, a device that will
coordinate consumers￿actions is needed. A common approach in the literature
is to assume an existence of a publicly observed sunspot signal. After deposit
decisions and portfolio choices are made, a number ￿ is drawn from a uniform
distribution on [0;1]. The draw itself is unrelated to any other variable in the
economy. Given ￿, late consumers behave according to the following decision
rule:
run if ￿ ￿ ￿,
don￿ t run otherwise
for some number ￿ 2 [0;1]. Variable ￿ is the probability of a run outcome16.
Naturally, a run proof contract induces ￿ = 0 and the sunspot realization is
ignored by individuals.
Let us start by assuming that the probability of a run ￿ is a ￿xed, exogenous
parameter of the economy. Banks take ￿ as given when choosing the optimal
contract and consumers have rational expectations of the following form: They
16Peck and Shell [24], whose approach we follow here, use the term "propensity to run".
25expect a bank run with exogenous probability ￿ whenever the banking contract
admits a run equilibrium.




















+ ￿￿u(c1) subject to
the same set of constraints as in the problem (FB). The ￿rst term in the objec-
tive function (multiplied by (1 ￿ ￿)) gives the expected utility of the contract
in case there is no run. The term multiplied by ￿ re￿ ects that in the event of
a run, the bank￿ s resources will for sure be depleted by the end of period 1 and
thus only proportion ￿ of consumers will be served (those ￿rst in line). Optimal
contract must be incentive-compatible, i.e. a late consumer￿ s expected payo⁄
from withdrawing early must be smaller than his expected payo⁄ from waiting

















u(c2 (￿))fp (￿)g (R):
As is standard in the literature, we will assume throughout the paper that
individuals truthfully reveal their type if they are indi⁄erent between doing so
and not doing so.
We know from Peck and Shell [24] that if ￿ is su¢ ciently small, banks ￿nd it
optimal to o⁄er a run admitting contract. In the banks-only economy however,
banks face a trade-o⁄ between the liquidity provision and the possibility of a
run. For low values of ￿, consumers are willing to tolerate the possibility of a
bank run since a run admitting contract insures then against private preference
shocks. As ￿ increases, consumers￿welfare goes down because if there is a run
26and an individual is not served, his consumption is equal to zero. There exists a
threshold level of probability of a run, b ￿, such that for any ￿ ￿ b ￿ banks ￿nd it
optimal to o⁄er a run proof contract (it is strictly preferred to the run admitting
contract).
Suppose for a moment that a bank would hold a portfolio that is close to a
run proof portfolio. Would consumers believe that the probability of a run this
bank faces is relatively small? Put more generally, should not bank￿ s portfolio
choice in￿ uence consumers￿beliefs about the likelihood of a run ￿? A way to
capture this in￿ uence is to consider a modi￿ed version of rational expectations
beliefs that are linked to the parameters of the banking contract. Work by Ennis
and Keister [16] is an example of such an approach and we adopt it here17.
The underlying intuition is that a mere possibility of a run alters banks￿
behavior by a⁄ecting their choice of the optimal contract (even though a run
may not occur eventually). Thus, the sunspot equilibrium allocation is not a
mere randomization over the equilibrium allocations of the economy without
sunspots. We therefore retain Diamond and Dybvig [15] spirit that bank runs
are to some extent chance events (this is represented by the randomness of
the sunspot variable ￿). At the same time, portfolio decisions of banks, asset
returns, and liquidity demand uncertainty a⁄ect determination of the ex ante
probability of a run ￿. This framework allows to model bank runs as chance
events after taking fundamentals into account.
A technical device used to formalize a relation between ￿ and parameters
of the contract is the so-called risk-factor of the run equilibrium, denoted by ￿.
The risk-factor represents how "risky" is running on the bank from the point of
view of the late consumer. The riskiness stems from the fact that he does not
know what other late consumers will do. The risk-factor ￿ re￿ ects the strength
17We refer an interested reader to their paper for the extensive discussion of the idea and
technical details.
27of incentives of individuals to run, which in turn determines the probability of
a run, ￿.
Formally, ￿(￿) is determined as follows. Let (￿;c1;c2 (￿)) be the contract
o⁄ered by the bank in period 0. Let ￿ (￿) denote a late consumer￿ s prior belief
about the probability that all other late consumers will run in state ￿ and
period 1. For ￿ (￿) = ￿(￿), a late consumer is indi⁄erent between withdrawing
in period 1 and period 2, i.e. the risk-factor is a cuto⁄ level of ￿ (￿) such that
for all ￿ (￿) > ￿(￿) running is the unique optimal action in state ￿. For ￿ 2 ￿￿,
￿(￿) is given by the following equation
￿(￿)￿u(c1) + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))u(c1) = (1 ￿ ￿(￿))u(c2 (￿)):
The left hand side is a late consumer￿ s expected payo⁄ of running when he
believes that with probability ￿(￿) all other late consumers will run. The right
hand side gives the expected payo⁄ of waiting until period 2 given the same
belief. Rearranging yields
￿(￿) =
u(c2 (￿)) ￿ u(c1)
u(c2 (￿)) ￿ u(c1) + ￿u(c1)
:
We can see that ￿(￿) 2 [0;1]. If the risk-factor is low, probability that ￿ (￿) >
￿(￿) increases and a late consumer chooses to run for a wider range of beliefs
about the actions of other late consumers.
Remark 11 It is only sensible to consider how risky is running on the bank in
state ￿ if the state-￿ banking allocation (c1;c2 (￿)) admits two equilibria to the
post-deposit game. If it is always optimal for a late consumer to run in state
￿, then ￿(￿) = 0. This is the case, for example, for all ￿ 2 ￿ n ￿￿ since here
a bank will run out of funds by the end of period 1 and it is thus optimal for a
late consumer to withdraw in period 1. Similarly, ￿(￿) = 0 if c1 > c2 (￿) holds
28for some ￿ (yet the incentive-compatibility constraint is still satis￿ed).
Remark 12 What is the relation between the approach of Peck and Shell [24]
and the risk-factor of the run equilibrium? We know that there are four kinds
of payo⁄s a late consumer can potentially consider: payo⁄s from withdrawing
in period 1 versus period 2 given that other late consumers withdraw in period 2
(incentive-compatibility) and payo⁄s from withdrawing in period 1 versus period
2 given that others run. In Peck and Shell[24], the probability of a run is ￿xed
and all that matters is incentive-compatibility. In the risk-factor approach, all
four payo⁄s play a role in the analysis. They are combined in the way described
above.







The lower ￿ the higher a late consumer￿ s ex ante incentive to run. Hence, we
assume that probability of a run ￿ is a decreasing function of the risk-factor ￿.
We do so to be able to use the established terminology: the lower probability of
a run, the better for the bank (as opposed to the bank aiming at increasing the
risk-factor of the run equilibrium). For simplicity, we posit a linear relation:
￿ (￿) = m ￿ h￿:
Essentially, we are re-scaling ￿ (which is determined endogenously). We are
not interested in the value of ￿ per se. We want to compare the probability of
a run banks face in the banks-only economy with the probability of a run in
the economy with banks and markets. Note that for h = 0 we are back to an
exogenously given ￿ considered initially.
We are interested in systemic runs, i.e. the situation when the probability
29of a run on a particular bank is determined by the economy-wide (average)
contract. When choosing the optimal contract, banks know and take as given
the relation between their contract and the risk-factor ￿ and thus probability
of a run ￿. The probability of a run is determined by the rational expectations
condition that requires the probability of a run, which is taken as given by banks,
to be the same as the probability implied by the contract all banks choose18.
6 Mixed Financial System
We now analyze an economy in which consumers can choose whether to invest
their endowments in the asset market, deposit contracts, or both. As in the
previous section, banks￿objective is to maximize the welfare of individuals.
In our setup, banks and markets provide di⁄erent services to consumers.
Banks provide an ex ante insurance against private liquidity shocks. They
guarantee (unless there is a run) a certain level of consumption in period 1.
Moreover, they are not exposed to asset price ￿ uctuations unless in distress (in
which case they might choose to liquidate their long-term asset holdings in the
market; more details shortly). However, banks may be subject to runs. We
know that if there is a run and a consumer is not served, the return on his bank
withdrawal is zero regardless of his type. Having (part of) the endowment in-
vested in the asset market guarantees positive consumption levels for both early
and late types in all states of the world. On the other hand, the asset mar-
ket cannot provide insurance against private preference shocks and consumers
trading in the market are exposed to the market risk.
We might therefore expect that risk-averse individuals will ￿nd it optimal to
18It is possible to consider the environment where the probability of a run on an individual
bank is given by that bank￿ s deposit contract, i.e. runs are idiosyncratic. The equilibrium
would be indistinguishable from the systemic case: either all banks would experience a run
or none would since all banks would choose the same contract. However, each bank would
internalize the e⁄ect of its contract on ￿. This would lower equilibrium ￿. See Ennis and
Keister [16].
30accept the banking-￿nancial contract in period 0. By investing (part of) their
endowment in the market, consumers can insure themselves against bank runs.
Even in the case of a bank run occurring and a consumer not being served,
a consumer still has his market investment so he will never end up with zero
consumption level.
6.1 Banking-Financial Contract
The banking-￿nancial contract speci￿es what part of a consumer￿ s endowment
is invested in the asset market. We denote this amount by W, 0 ￿ W ￿ 1. The
contract further speci￿es what fraction of W is invested in the short-term asset.
This fraction is denoted by ￿. Fraction (1 ￿ ￿) is invested in the long-term
asset.
The remaining part of a consumer￿ s endowment, (1 ￿ W), is exchanged for
the deposit contract. As in the previous section, period-one return on the de-
mand deposit investment is a ￿xed payo⁄ multiple cB
1 . Period-two payo⁄ mul-
tiple cB
2 (￿) depends on the realization of ￿ and R. More precisely, period-one
return on banking withdrawals is (1 ￿ W)cB
1 and, similarly, period-two return
on withdrawals in state ￿ is equal to (1 ￿ W)cB
2 (￿). Banks choose in period 0
what fraction of (1 ￿ W) is invested in the short-term asset (￿). The remaining
resources are invested in the long-term asset (fraction (1 ￿ ￿)).
If banks￿short-term asset holdings are not enough to cover withdrawals in
period 1, they can acquire the short-term asset in the market by selling some or
all of their long-term asset holdings. Of course, banks can still privately liquidate
the long-term asset and gather a return L per unit19. A bank ￿nds out how
high is the aggregate demand for liquidity in period 1 by paying o⁄ cB
1 using
the short-term asset holdings ￿rst and giving out "slips", i.e. promises of cB
1 ,
19We know that banks will need to liquidate (either in the market or privately) their entire
long-term asset holdings in case there is a run. They will need to liquidate a part of the
long-term asset holdings if ￿ < ￿ < ￿.
31once it runs out of the short-term asset. Given this information, a bank decides
what fraction of the long-term asset holdings will be sold given its expectations
about the price. We assume that banks know and take as given price function
P1. The reason we assume banks are price-takers is to keep symmetry with
individuals who are also price-takers. Let b ￿ denote a fraction of the long-term
asset holdings banks need to liquidate in period 1. Then, the equilibrium price




￿b(1 ￿ ￿)W + b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ W)
;
where superscript L stands for "liquidation". We know from Lemma 2 that the
equilibrium price when banks do not trade in the market fully reveals ￿ and
from Lemma 4 that P1 (￿) ￿ L for all ￿. We can show that the same holds true
for PL
1 (￿).
Lemma 13 Equilibrium price of the long-term asset when banks trade in the
market fully reveals ￿ and is always greater or equal to the liquidation return L.
After a consumer learns his type, he decides when to withdraw from the bank
and orders a portfolio rebalancing transaction. An early consumer decides what
fraction of his long-term asset holdings to sell and a late consumer chooses an
optimal amount of the long-term asset to acquire, given the expectations about
the price P1. The consumer is only allowed to adjust his period 0 portfolio, e.g.
if he sells the short-term asset, he cannot sell a larger amount of the short-term
asset than the amount he invested in period 0.







imize the expected utility of consumers. Bank￿ s optimization problem (BMP)
is formulated below20:
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W:
Variable c1 (￿) represents the total consumption of an early consumer if there is
no run on the bank. Variable c2 (￿) is the total consumption of a late consumer
if there is no run. If a bank run occurs in period 1 and a consumer is served, his
consumption is equal to cS
1 (￿) if he is an early type and cS
2 (￿) if he is a late type.
In case there is a run or running-out and a consumer is not served, he is left
with his market investment only. We let cN
1 (￿) and cN
2 (￿) denote consumption
bundles of an early and late type, respectively, for this case. Finally, cW
2 (￿) is
the total consumption of a late consumer who decides to withdraw in period
1 when other late consumers withdraw in period 2. In case of running out,
a late consumer would get cWN
2 (￿). It is important to realize that price P1
varies depending on whether or not banks trade in the market and how much
long-term asset banks sell.
Incentive-compatibility is now de￿ned in terms of total consumptions of a
late consumer in relevant states (it includes the corresponding return on the
market portfolio).
If W = 1 in the optimum, the problem (BMP) reduces to the problem
(MP) from section 4. If W = 0 in the optimum, the problem (BMP) reduces
to the problem (BP) from section 5.
34We denote the risk-factor of the run equilibrium in state ￿ in the economy
with banks and markets by ￿



































































As in section 5, the ex ante incentive to run ￿








M (￿)fp (￿)g (R)
and the probability of a run, denoted by ￿M, is de￿ned as
￿M = m ￿ h￿
M;
where m and h are some positive constants.
We can now see how the market investment can lower the probability of a
run banks face. We know that in the banks-only economy, if there is a run
and a consumer is not served, his consumption is equal to zero. Using our
notation, cN
1 = 0 and, more importantly, cN
2 = 0. In the economy with banks
and markets, as long as consumer diversi￿es by investing in both the asset
market and deposit contracts, cN
1 (￿) and cN
2 (￿) are positive in all states of the
world. The higher cN
2 (￿), ceteris paribus, the higher ￿
M (￿), and the lower ￿M.
There is an additional channel through which the market investment lowers a
35late consumer￿ s incentive to run. In case there is a run, banks need to liquidate
their entire long-term asset holdings. When banks sell the long-term asset in the
market, its price decreases21. This creates capital gains for late consumers who
are the buyers of the long-term asset. Thus, cN
2 (￿) increases and the probability
of a run on the banking sector further decreases.
7 Examples and Discussion
Due to the complexity of the banks￿problem we proceed by computing a series
of numerical examples which illustrate properties of the optimal contract22.
The functional form for the utility function is u(c) = 4c
1+4c
23. Random
variable ￿ can take on two values, ￿1 = 0:3 and ￿2 = 0:35, each with equal
probability. We only consider a small variability in ￿ since we are primarily
concerned with the phenomenon of bank runs (as opposed to running-out).
The random variable R can also take on two values, namely R1 = 1:05 and
R2 = 1:15, each with equal probability. Thus, there are four states of the world
￿ = f1;2;3;4g, each occurring with probability 1=4.
￿ 1 2 3 4
￿ ￿1 ￿1 ￿2 ￿2
R R1 R2 R1 R2
When solving for the optimal banking allocation in the banks-only economy,
we set L = PL
1 , where PL
1 is the price that clears the market in the banking-
￿nancial economy when banks liquidate their entire long-term asset holdings in
the asset market (keeping all other parameter values the same). This facilitates
21The asset market is "down". Historically, banking crises were often accompanied by the
stock market crashes.
22The computations were performed using Maple 9.51. Details are available from the author.
23Thus, the autarky level of utility is equal to u = 0:8.
36the direct comparison of the properties of the banking contract in the economy
with banks only and the banking-￿nancial contract.
7.1 Fixed Probability of a Run
We start by assuming that ￿ is a ￿xed, exogenous parameter of the economy.
We set ￿ = 0:5%. We compute the optimal contract in the economy with banks
only (Example 1) and in the economy with banks and markets (Example 2) and
compare banks￿behavior in the two cases.
Example 1 (Banking Allocation I) We present the results in Table 1.
￿ c1 c2 (1);c2 (2);c2 (3);c2 (4) ￿
1;￿
2 b ￿ (%) EUB
0:35 1:0 1:046;1:139;1:049;1:149 0:85;0:77 2:44 0:80868
Table 1: Optimal Banking Allocation, ￿ = 0:5%
Consumers exchange their entire endowment for the demand deposit con-
tract. Banks invest a fraction ￿ equal to 0:35 in the short-term asset. Those
consumers who turn out to be early in period 1 can withdraw c1 = 1:0 from
the bank. These two variables together with the liquidation value of banks￿
long-term asset holdings determine what fraction of consumers will be served
by the bank in the event of a run (￿). We have that banks will serve a fraction
equal to 0:85 in states 1 and 2 and a fraction equal to 0:77 in states 3 and 4. If
the realization of R is low, i.e. if ￿ = 1 or ￿ = 3, late consumers get a relatively
low period-two consumption, c￿
2 (1) = 1:046 and c￿
2 (3) = 1:049.
As the probability of a run increases, the expected utility from the run-
admitting contract decreases. We can compute the cuto⁄level of the probability
of a run beyond which the run proof contract becomes optimal. Banks start
o⁄ering the run proof contract when its bene￿t (immunity to runs) exactly
37outweighs its cost (no provision of the liquidity insurance). For the parameter
values considered, this occurs for ￿ equal to 2:44%. We denote this value by b ￿.








0:271 0:784 1:145;1:249;1:172;1:284 0:80585
Table 2: Run Proof Allocation
The best run proof allocation has ￿
RP = 0:271 and cRP
1 = 0:784. In this
case, banks signi￿cantly reduce the period-one return on withdrawals to make
sure that they have enough resources to pay o⁄ cRP
1 to everyone in period 1.
The elimination of the liquidity insurance provision reduces the expected utility
to 0:80585.
Example 2 (Banking-Financial Allocation I) We list the solution to
the problem (BMP) in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
￿￿ P1 (￿1);P1 (￿2) a(P1);a(P2) W￿ PL
1 (￿1);PL
1 (￿2)
0:331 1:096;0:918 0:95;1 0:862 0:768;0:642
Table 3: Banking-Financial Allocation I, ￿ = 0:5%
In the optimum, individuals invest W￿ = 0:862 in the asset market out of
which about one third, ￿￿ = 0:331, is invested in the short-term asset. For
completeness, a￿ (P1 (￿1)) = 0:950 and a￿ (P2 (￿2)) = 1. Table 3 also lists
equilibrium asset prices which reveal the aggregate demand for liquidity, ￿. We
present two sets of prices: one arises if banks do not trade in the market and the
other, with superscript L, arises if banks need to liquidate their entire long-term
asset holdings. We see that PL
1 (1) and PL












0:371 1:061 1:019;1:109;1:016;1:112 0:81;0:73 6:3
Table 4: Banking-Financial Allocation II, ￿ = 0:5%
Table 4 presents banks decisions in the banking-￿nancial economy. Banks
invest much more in the short-term asset (optimal ￿
￿ has increased as compared
to the banks-only economy), which enables them to provide more liquidity in-
surance (higher cB
1 at the expense of lower cB
2 (￿)). This also implies that banks
are able to serve a smaller number of consumers in the event of a run. Banks are
less concerned about the proportion of people served because those not served
will still consume a positive amount: cN
1 and cN
2 are greater than zero. On
the contrary, in the banks-only economy, those not served end up with zero
consumption and thus banks aim at serving more consumers in a run. Hence,
the market investment acts as insurance against runs and the existence of this
insurance gives banks more ￿ exibility in their portfolio choice. In the banking-
￿nancial economy, banks "specialize" in liquidity provision.
We ￿nd that the run proof contract is not o⁄ered in the banking-￿nancial
economy. Intuitively, this is because the provision of the liquidity insurance
constitutes the comparative advantage of banks in this model. If banks do
not provide the liquidity insurance in the economy with markets, consumers
have no reason to invest in deposit contracts. Instead, as the probability of
a run increases, consumers invest increasingly more in the asset market since
the demand deposit contract becomes more risky. We can compute the cuto⁄
level of the probability of a run beyond which investing in the asset market only
becomes optimal. This is also the point beyond which consumers no longer get
the ex ante liquidity insurance since it can only be provided by banks. For the
39parameter values considered, this occurs for ￿ equal to 6:3%. We denote this
value by b ￿
￿ (see Table 4). We list the optimal asset market allocation in Table
6.
It is interesting to note that the cuto⁄ value of ￿ in the banking-￿nancial
economy above which runs are no longer a concern (and no ex ante liquidity
insurance is provided) is much higher than the similar cuto⁄ in the banks-only
economy, b ￿
￿ > b ￿.
Table 5 summarizes consumer￿ s ￿nal consumption allocations (consisting of
the return on the market investment and bank withdrawals) in each of the four
aggregate states of the world. If there is no run, early and late types receive
c￿
1 (￿) and c￿
2 (￿), respectively. In the event of a run, early consumers get cS
1 (￿)
if served and cN
1 (￿) if not, and late consumers get cS
















1 (1:064;1:02) (0:875;1:142) (0:728;0:995) 0:80955
2 (1:064;1:115) (0:875;1:237) (0:728;1:090) 0:80955
3 (0:961;1:072) (0:802;1:219) (0:655;1:072) 0:80955
4 (0:961;1:174) (0:802;1:321) (0:655;1:174) 0:80955
Table 5: Banking-Financial Allocation III, ￿ = 0:5%
Example 3 (Asset Market Allocation) Consumers invest 0:330 fraction
of their initial endowment in the short-term asset in period 0. In period 1 they
adjust their portfolio holdings. Optimal consumption allocations for the two
types are listed below. The resulting expected utility is equal to 0:809528.
40￿ ￿￿ P1 (￿) a￿ (P1 (￿)) (c1 (￿);c2 (￿)) EUM
1 0:330 1:096 0:954 (1:065;1:020) 0:809528
2 0:330 1:096 0:954 (1:065;1:116) 0:809528
3 0:330 0:915 1 (0:943;1:082) 0:809528
4 0:330 0:915 1 (0:943;1:185) 0:809528
Table 6: Asset Market Allocation
In summary, as long as the probability of a run remains su¢ ciently low, i.e.
below b ￿
￿, the expected utility from the banking-￿nancial allocation is higher
when compared to both the banking allocation and the asset market allocation,
EUBM > EUM > EUB. This is because banks and markets provide di⁄erent
services to consumers.
7.2 The Risk-Factor of the Run Equilibrium
We now let ￿ depend on the properties of the contract o⁄ered. We model
the probability of a run banks face using the concept of the risk-factor of the
run equilibrium described in section 5.2. Constant m is set equal to 0:01 and
constant h is equal to 0:002. (We choose m and h such that re-scaling ￿ yields
a reasonable value of the probability of a run (between 0 and 1)).
Example 4 (Banking Allocation II) We present the optimal banking




2 : (1);(2);(3);(4) ￿
1;￿
2 ￿
￿ ￿ (%) EUB
0:34 0:976 1:06;1:15;1:06;1:17 0:962;0:852 0:0534 0:989 0:8085
Table 7: Optimal Banking Allocation II
Qualitatively, the results are similar to those in Table 1. Two variables are
41new: the risk-factor of the run equilibrium ￿
￿ is equal to 0:0534 and the implied
probability of a run is given by 0:989%. We want to know what are the e⁄ects
of the presence of the asset market on the probability of a run banks face.
Example 5 (Banking-Financial Allocation II) We can see (Table 9)
that the riskiness of running in the banking-￿nancial economy increases, ￿
M =
0:0556. Hence, consumers￿incentives to run decrease and the probability of a
run banks face is reduced in our example, ￿M = 0:98887. Two mechanisms play
a role here. First, the market investment acts as insurance in the event of a
run, i.e. cN
1 > 0 and cN
2 > 0 whereas in the banks-only economy cN
1 = cN
2 = 0.
In the banking-￿nancial economy, the higher cN
2 (￿), ceteris paribus, the higher
￿
M (￿), and the lower ￿M. Second, when banks sell the long-term asset in the
market, its price decreases. This creates capital gains for late consumers who
are the buyers of the long-term asset. Thus, cN
2 (￿) increases and the probability
of a run on the banking sector further decreases.





0:331 (1:096;0:918) 0:92 (0:906;0:744)











0:371 1:061 1:019;1:109;1:016;1:112 0:887;0:791 0:0556 0:98887
Table 9: Banking-Financial Allocation II
In general, whether the probability of a run banks face in the banking-
￿nancial economy is lower than in the banks-only economy depends on how
dramatic the relative reduction in the period-one return on withdrawals in the
banks-only economy is. We know that banks o⁄er a considerably smaller degree
of the liquidity provision in the banks-only economy, i.e. c￿
1 is relatively small
42and c￿
2 (￿) is relatively high. On the contrary, the banking-￿nancial contract
o⁄ers more liquidity insurance which reduces the di⁄erence between the period-
one and the period-two consumption allocations and, ceteris paribus, decreases
the riskiness of running. However, as long as the reduction in the period-one
return on withdrawals in the banks-only economy is relatively small, the two
mechanisms we discussed above will play a major role. Hence, we can expect
that the probability of a run banks face in the banking-￿nancial economy is
smaller than the probability of a run in the banks-only economy.
Returning to our example, banks face a smaller probability of a run while
providing more liquidity insurance when compared to the optimal banking allo-
cation. In the banks-only economy, banks face a trade-o⁄between the provision
of the liquidity insurance and stability. In the banking-￿nancial economy, the
market investment weakens this trade-o⁄since it provides insurance in the event
of a bank run.
Table 10 summarizes consumer￿ s ￿nal consumption allocations (consisting
of the return on the market investment and bank withdrawals) in each of the
four aggregate states of the world. Again, consumers are ex ante better o⁄ in














1 (1:064;1:020) (0:947;1:084) (0:862;0:999) 0:80954
2 (1:064;1:115) (0:947;1:179) (0:862;1:094) 0:80954
3 (0:955;1:076) (0:847;1:161) (0:762;1:076) 0:80954
4 (0:955;1:178) (0:847;1:263) (0:762;1:178) 0:80954
Table 10: Banking-Financial Allocation III
438 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze an incomplete markets economy in which consumers
can choose whether to invest their endowment in the asset market (indirectly
through banks), banks o⁄ering demand deposit contracts, or both. Banks and
markets provide di⁄erent services to consumers.
In a nonstochastic economy, the ￿rst-best (full information) banking contract
is strictly preferred to the market allocation. This is because banks create an
ex ante cross-subsidy between the early and late consumers. This liquidity
insurance is valuable for risk-averse consumers and is impossible to achieve in
the competitive market. However, the cross-subsidy makes banks vulnerable to
runs. A banking-￿nancial contract that allows consumers to invest part of their
endowment in the market indirectly, through banks, is strictly preferred to the
optimal banks-only contract since the market investment acts as insurance in
the event of a bank run.
In a stochastic economy, the ex ante insurance against private preference
shocks can still be provided by the banking sector only. The stochastic nature
of the economy introduces an additional mechanism. Aggregate liquidity shocks
cause ￿ uctuations of the asset prices in the market. Thus, individual market
portfolios are subject to market risk. Changing prices redistribute wealth be-
tween the early and late consumers and can smooth consumption in some states
of the world. Of course, this market redistribution occurs ex post. Nevertheless,
this mechanism increases the expected utility from markets-only allocation as
compared to the nonstochastic case.
Within this framework, we study the implications of ￿nancial deepening for
banks￿role in liquidity provision and for the probability of a run on the banking
sector.
Consumers insure themselves against bank runs by investing in the market
44portfolio. This insurance reduces their incentives to run and, in our examples,
probability of a run decreases. However, it also means giving up an ex ante
cross-subsidy on the fraction of wealth invested in the market. Banks reward
consumers for getting insurance that gives them more ￿ exibility in their port-
folio choice by o⁄ering a higher cross-subsidy on the portion of wealth invested
in the demand deposit contract (as compared to the economy with banks only).
The trade-o⁄ between the provision of the liquidity insurance and stability is
weakened. The ex ante welfare increases even though markets remain incom-
plete.
In this work, we do not consider other services provided by banks, such as
payment services. Incorporating these aspects of banking into our model would
allow for a richer set of interactions between banks and markets. This is left for
future research.
An important implication of our model is that emerging economies can re-
duce occurrence of panic-based runs and thus increase stability of their banking
sector by supporting the development of asset markets.
45Appendix
LEMMA 2 Price P1 fully reveals ￿ in period 1.
Proof. We ￿rst show that price P1 cannot be non-revealing. Suppose not.
Then, P1 = const for all states. Then, all consumers know is their own type
and they choose the same a and b for all states. But then, P1 =
(1￿￿)a￿
￿b(1￿￿)
must be constant across states. This can only be the case if a = 0 8￿ and the
resulting P1 = 0. But then, a = 0 is not optimal. This is not an equilibrium.
Contradiction.
We proceed by showing that P1 cannot reveal ￿ only partly. Suppose not.
Then, there exist two states of the world with distinct realizations of ￿, say ￿1
and ￿2, ￿1 6= ￿2, and at the same time P1 (￿1) = P1 (￿2). Then, consumers
must choose the same a and b in these two states. By the same argument as
above, this cannot be the case.
It follows that P1 always fully reveals ￿ in period 1.
LEMMA 3 There exists a strictly positive price, which we denote by P1, such
that for all P1 ￿ P1, late types prefer to completely diversify their portfolios, i.e.
their demand for the long-term asset for a given ￿ is zero. Similarly, there exists
a strictly positive price, which we denote by P1, such that for all P1 ￿ P1, late
consumers want to hold long-term asset only and thus sell their entire holdings
of the short-term asset in period 1.
Proof. A late consumer chooses a to maximize the expected utility of his
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0 ￿ a(P1) ￿ 1:
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￿g (R) + ￿0 ￿ ￿1 = 0
and ￿0 ￿ 0, ￿1 ￿ 0:
First, consider case a = 0, ￿0 ￿ 0 and ￿1 = 0. Then,
X
R






￿!g (R) + ￿0 = 0
Thus, it must be the case that
X
R






￿!g (R) ￿ 0 (C1)
with equality for ￿0 = 0. Note that it cannot be the case that P1 < R for
all realizations of R. Also, if P1 = R always holds, then the price reveals
R, contradiction with price revealing ￿ only. Then, we must have either that
P1 > R always holds24 or that P1 < R and P1 > R for some realizations of R.
Second, consider case a = 1, ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 ￿ 0. Then, the ￿rst-order































￿!g (R) ￿ 0 (C2)
24We shall see later (in the Proof of Proposition 6.) that this cannot be the case because
the short-term asset would be dominated by the long-term asset in this case.
47with equality for ￿1 = 0. Here, it cannot be the case that P1 ￿ R holds for all
realizations of R.
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￿g (R) = 0:
We can see that P1 ￿ R (P1 ￿ R) cannot hold for all realizations of R since
that would require (for the ￿rst-order condition to hold) P1 = R and thus the
price would reveal R, contradiction with price revealing ￿ only. Thus, we must
have P1 > R and P1 < R for some realizations of R.
Now, there exists a price, which we denote by P1, such that for all P1 ￿ P1,
late types￿demand for the long-term asset for a given ￿ is zero: a = 0. This
price is the minimum price that satis￿es (C1). Note that the left hand side of








￿!g (R) < 0
and so all P1 ￿ P1 will satisfy (C1) and thus a = 0.
Similarly, there exists a price, which we denote by P1, such that for all
P1 ￿ P1, late consumers want to sell their entire holdings of the short-term
asset in exchange for the long-term asset. For example, for any P1 ￿ min
￿
fRg,
condition (C2) is satis￿ed and a = 1.
LEMMA 4 Price P1 is always greater or equal to the liquidation return L
and early consumers supply a strictly positive amount of the long-term asset to
the market.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. there exists ￿ such that P1 (￿) < L. Then, we have
b(P1) = 0 and S = 0. For the market to clear, it must be the case that D = 0
implying a(P1) = 0. We know from the previous lemma that a = 0 if and only
48if P1 ￿ P1 > 1 > L. Contradiction with P1 < L. The claim follows.
PROPOSITION 5 For a given ￿, there are three possible cases. 1) The
equilibrium price is equal to L. Late consumers prefer to hold the long-term
asset only and early consumers sell the fraction
￿(1￿￿)
L￿(1￿￿) of their long-term asset
holdings. 2) The price in the market that would arise if late consumers sold
their entire short-term asset holdings,
(1￿￿)￿
￿(1￿￿), is smaller than P1. Then, late
consumers prefer to hold the long-term asset only and the resulting equilibrium
price is equal to
(1￿￿)￿
￿(1￿￿). 3) The price
(1￿￿)￿
￿(1￿￿) is greater or equal to P1. Then, late
consumers prefer to diversify their portfolio holdings. They choose 0 < a ￿ 1




Proof. We want to show that P1 < P1 always holds in equilibrium. Suppose
not and we have P1 ￿ P1 > 0 for some ￿. We know that P1 =
(1￿￿)a￿
￿(1￿￿) . The
fact that P1 ￿ P1 implies (by de￿nition of P1) that a = 0 and hence we get
P1 = 0. Contradiction with P1 ￿ P1 > 0.
PROPOSITION 6 In equilibrium, consumers prefer to diversify their period-
zero portfolios by investing a strictly positive fraction of the endowment in the
long-term asset and thus a positive fraction of the endowment in the short-term
asset.
Proof. We prove each property in turn by contradiction.
First, suppose an individual ￿nds it optimal to hold the short-term asset
only, i.e. ￿ = 1, ￿2 = 0 and ￿3 ￿ 0. At t = 1, then, price P1 must be high
enough so as to induce zero demand for the long-term asset, i.e. a(P1) = 0.
Su¢ cient condition would be P1 > maxfRg (see condition (C1)). The necessary
condition is P1 > 1 in all states (since R is always greater than 1). In this case,





[￿u ￿(c1 (￿))[1 ￿ P1 (￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)u ￿(c2 (￿))
(1 ￿ R)]!f (￿)g (R) ￿ ￿3 = 0:
cannot hold (short-term asset dominates the long-term asset). Contradiction.
We must have and ￿ < 1 and ￿2 = 0 in the optimum.
Now suppose that optimal ￿ is equal to zero, i.e. an individual only invests
in the long-term asset. Then, ￿2 ￿ 0 and ￿3 = 0. Since ￿ is always greater
than 0 (by assumption), early consumers will want to o⁄er their long-term asset
holdings for sale. Since late types have nothing to o⁄er in exchange, the price
in the market P1 must be equal to zero for all states. In this case, c1 = 0
and c2 = R!. However, given that the price of the long-term asset is zero,
short-term asset in fact dominates the long-term asset. Thus, ￿￿ = 0 cannot be
optimal. Contradiction.











R + 1 ￿ a(P1)
￿￿
f (￿)g (R) = 0:
LEMMA 10 Suppose ￿ is non-stochastic. Then, the ￿rst best contract sat-
is￿es c￿
1 > 1 and c￿
2 (￿) < R. This implies the preference for liquidity (and
cross-subsidization) between early and late consumers.
Proof. We ￿rst show that c￿
1 > 0 and ￿
￿ < 1 holds for the solution to the
problem (FB). We then consider the case of non-random ￿ and sketch the
proof of the Lemma.
















￿3 (￿)[￿ + R(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿c1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c2 (￿)]￿













￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c2 (￿)
￿
￿
f (￿)g (R) +
X
￿2￿￿
’(￿)[￿ ￿ ￿c1]f (￿) +
X
￿2￿￿
’(￿)[￿ + L(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿c1]f (￿):










(￿ + L(1 ￿ ￿))￿ (2)
u ￿(c1)c1 ￿ u(c1)
c2
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￿f (￿) = 0; ￿1 ￿ 0:












￿3 (￿)[1 ￿ R]￿ (4)

















’(￿)(1 ￿ L)f (￿) = 0; ￿2 ￿ 0:
51Complementary slackness conditions are:
￿1c1 = 0
￿2 (1 ￿ ￿) = 0









￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c2 (￿)
i
= 0 for ￿ 2 ￿￿
’(￿)(￿ ￿ ￿c1) = 0 for ￿ 2 ￿￿
’(￿)(￿ + L(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿c1) = 0 for ￿ 2 ￿￿
Note that equation 3 implies u ￿(c2 (￿)) = ￿3 (￿) and thus ￿3 (￿) > 0. We
now claim that c￿
1 > 0 must hold. Suppose not and c￿
1 = 0. Then, ￿ = ￿ = 1





￿[u ￿(c1) ￿ u ￿(c2 (￿))]f (￿)g (R) + ￿1 = 0:
However, c1 = 0 together with the strict concavity of u give u ￿(c1)￿u ￿(c2 (￿)) > 0
and thus equation 2 cannot hold. Contradiction. Thus, we have c￿




￿ < 1 and ￿￿
2 = 0. To see this, suppose otherwise. Then,
￿3 (￿) = 0 for ￿ 2 ￿￿ for the complementarity slackness condition to hold.
But this is not possible since ￿3 (￿) > 0 for all ￿. Then, banks need to ensure



















u(c2 (￿))fp (￿)g (R):
For this condition to hold there must be at least one ￿ such that u(c1) ￿
u(c2 (￿)), which is equivalent to c1 ￿ 1￿￿c1
1￿￿ for this ￿. It follows that c1 ￿ 1
must hold. This implies that ￿ = ￿ = 1 and ’(￿) = 0. But then, equation 4
52cannot hold. Contradiction.
Now, if ￿ is non-random, the bank knows exactly how many consumers will
arrive in period 1. Intuitively, the bank will invest such that no ine¢ cient
liquidation of the long-term asset takes place in period 1. It is easy to show
that c1 =
￿
￿ and c2 =
(1￿￿)R
1￿￿ in the optimum. FOC yields:
X
R




We want to show that c1 > 1 and c2 < R in the optimum. Suppose that c￿
1 = 1
and thus c￿
2 = R instead. We know that cu ￿(c) is decreasing in c for [1;1)
since ￿
cu ￿ ￿ (c)
u ￿ (c) > 1 on this interval. Given that R is always greater than 1, we
get u ￿(1) > Ru ￿(R) for all R. But then, we have
P
R




and thus the pair (1;R) does not satisfy the FOC. Strict concavity of u implies
that c￿
1 > 1 and c￿
2 < R must hold.
LEMMA 13 Equilibrium price of the long-term asset when banks trade in
the market fully reveals ￿ and is always greater or equal to the liquidation return
L.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. there exist two distinct values of ￿, say ￿1 and ￿2, ￿1 6=
￿2, such that PL
1 (￿1) = PL










































= 0 must hold and thus P1 = 0. But
then, a = 0 is not optimal. Contradiction.
53FOCs of the problem (BMP) with respect to cB
1 , cB













u ￿(c1)(1 ￿ W)cB
























u ￿(c1)(1 ￿ W)cB
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= 0; ￿1 ￿ 0
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)u ￿(c2)(1 ￿ W)f (￿)g (R) ￿ ￿3 (1 ￿ ￿)f (￿)g (R) + ￿6￿ (6)
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R + (1 ￿ a)￿ ￿ cB
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fp (R)g (R)g + ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿


















































































































R + 1 ￿ a
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R + 1 ￿ a
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1 ￿ a)fp (R)g (R)g ￿ ￿5 = 0 and ￿5 ￿ 0:
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